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Biological & Chemical Security

Over the past two decades, concern has grown in the U.S. over the potential for biological and chemical attacks. This concern has resulted in increased focus on laboratory security on university campuses, especially in areas of research where select or potentially hazardous chemicals or biological agents, such a viruses that have the potential to be weaponized, are researched.

In response to these increased security concerns, new laws and government regulations have been enacted to ensure the security of research facilities. The result is a complex set of regulations and statutes that scientists and their institutions must comply with and understand. Among these are the Public Health Security and Bio-Terrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 and Chemical Facilities and Anti-Terrorism Standards.

In this section information can be found on biological and chemical security.

 

 

AAU and COGR comment to Mr. Dustin Pitsch, Defense Acquisition Regulations System, on DFARS Case 2013-D018, October 30, 2015.
Comments from AAU, APLU, COGR on the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Revisions to Definitions in the Export Administration Regulations (RIN 0694-AG32), August 3, 2015.
Enclosed please find comments from the Association of American Universities, the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, and the Council on Governmental Relations on the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Revisions to Definitions in the Export Administration Regulations (RIN 0694-AG32). Our staff is available to provide more information or discuss these matters further should you have any questions regarding our comments.
Comments from AAU, APLU, and the Council on Governmental Relations on the ITAR Amendment – Revisions to Definitions; Data Transmission and Storage (RIN 1400-AD70), August 3, 2015.
As you have duly noted in the past that a “one-size-fits-all approach may not be optimal for such a diverse regulated community"...
The FBI WMD Directorate with AAAS, AAU and APLU, held the fifth meeting in this series. The report, "Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: Personnel Security Programs" is the result of that meeting.
The FBI WMD Directorate with AAAS, AAU and APLU, held the forth meeting in this series. The report, "Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: Implementing the Revised Select Agents and Toxin Regulations" is the result from that meeting.
The FBI WMD Directorate developed a robust biosecurity outreach and awareness program with AAAS, AAU and APLU, they held the third meeting in this series. The report, "Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: International Science and Security" is the result from that meeting.
AAU, COGR comments to Dr. Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director—Chemical and Biological Countermeasures, Office of Science and Technology Policy, on the draft document "United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC)."
The FBI WMD Directorate developed a robust biosecurity outreach and awareness program with AAAS, AAU and APLU, they held the third meeting in this series. The report, "Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: A Discussion about Dual Use Review and Oversight at Research Institutions" is the result from that meeting.