1	Science and Secrecy: NSDD 189 - Prologue to A New Dialogue? American Association for the Advancement of Science R&D Colloquium April 10, 2003 John C. Crowley Vice President for Federal Relations Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2	My Assignment To tell briefly the story of a particular slice of recent science policy history as a possible prologue to the future. I will briefly look at: - the late 1940s; - the fears of the early 1980s and origins of NSDD 189; - the concerns of the post-911 era; - conclusion.
3	Little Is Truly New Here. The Tensions Between Science and Security Are Deeply Rooted. • The tensions between science and national security during World War II are well documented and widely known. • Following the war, in 1947, the President’s Scientific Research Board report on Science and Public Policy included the following statement:
4	"“Strict military security in..." “Strict military security in the narrow sense is not entirely consistent with the broader requirements of national security. To be secure as a Nation we must maintain a climate conducive to the full flowering of free inquiry. However important secrecy about military weapons may be, the fundamental discoveries of researchers must circulate freely to have full beneficial effect. Security regulations, therefore should be applied only when strictly necessary and then limited to specific instruments, machines or processes. They should not attempt to cover basic principles of fundamental knowledge.”
5	AAAS Special Committee on Civil Liberties for Scientists 19 August 1949 Executive Order No. 9835 -- The Loyalty Order - no person shall be employed in a federal post if he is believed to be disloyal to the government of the United States. The E.O. goal: “complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States” of all in its service. AAAS Committee urged a focus on behavior not beliefs.
6	The AAAS Committee Quoted Judge Cardozo “Experimentation there may be in many things of deep concern, but not in setting boundaries to thought, for thought freely communicated is the indispensable condition of intelligent experimentation, the one test of its validity.”
7	They Concluded by Quoting President Truman “Continuous research by our best scientists is the key to American leadership and true national security. This work may be made impossible by the creation of an atmosphere in which no man feels safe against the public airing of unfounded rumors, gossip and vilification.”
8	Then, We Endured The Fifties The House UnAmerican Activities Committee The McCarthy era “Duck and Cover” drills in schools.
9	Thirty Years Later, After…. The Korean War The Space Race Viet Nam
10	The Fears of 1980s: Openness = Vulnerability to Soviet Threat • The U.S. - Soviet relationship deteriorated to the levels of the Cold War of the 1950s. Fears:- - Loss of militarily significant technology and superiority; - Loss of technological leadership and know-how; - Loss of industrial competitiveness. Universities were seen as targets, points of leakage and “hemorrhage” of technology, as the Nation’s “soft underbelly”.
11	National Academies Suspended Bi-Lateral Exchanges “The only appropriate way for the scientific community to deal with any kind of problem, scientific or human, is through reason and discussion…If we cannot learn how to rationalize our differences, how to resolve then by argument rather than by threats and by cutting off relations, then we are really lost.” Weisskopf and Wilson, Science, 5-30-1980
12	The Election of 1980 and the DOD-University Forum, 1981 April 3, 2001, HASC Hearing. Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary, R&E. HASC Mandate:- A new DSB Report: University Responsiveness to National Security Requirements. Dr. DeLauer asked AAU for a report (done 11-81). DSB report released January, 1982. Each report recommended a mechanism for dialogue be established. President Paul Gray and Walter Milne of MIT first made the proposal to AAU.
13	DOD-University Forum Co-chairs: Under Secretary DeLauer Dr. Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford University Members: - 7 university CEOs - 6 senior DOD officials and 3 DBS Members Dr. DeLauer established three technical working groups: Foreign languages and area studies Science and engineering education Technology Export Controls, David A. Wilson, U. Ca. Co-chair Met May, 1982; 2-year FACA charter, 12-15-83 Staff: OSD, AAU (on behalf of AAU, ACE, NASULGC) Dr. DeLauer retired in1985; the Forum expired.
14	“The Government, Secrecy, and University Research”, D. Kennedy, 4-23-1982 Promising signs of change. Apply visa controls. Classify the technology. Enable universities to decide in advance. New burdensome regulations will cost the nation more than it can be worth.
15	Contemporary Incidents April, 1982, E.O. 12356, broadened authority to classify information; included: - “Basic scientific research information not clearly related to national security may not be classified.” - The meaning of this was widely debated. August, 1982, “Raid at San Diego”: The first 2 papers were withdrawn from 26th annual Society for Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE) conference; in all, more than 100 papers were withdrawn at government request.
16	Wm. D. Carey: “Handcuffing Science”, 9-24-1982 “ When a proper concern for the national security is burdened by clumsy execution, something is subtracted from the fundamental respect that is owed the necessary goal of safeguarding defense secrets. Once confidence in the judgment and the management of the security process is shaken, its integrity is served badly. The defense authorities have very good reason to know that the scientific community has proved its respect for the national security through three hot wars and a long cold one. That respect must be reciprocated.”
17	Corson Panel of NAS/NRC, Spring 1982 Mandate: - Examine evidence of technology leakage and methods of controlling it; - Seek policy measures by which competing national goals of defense and intellectual freedom could be accommodated satisfactorily. A Distinguished Panel. The Panel Reviewed Classified Information.
18	Corson Panel: “Scientific Communication and National Security”, 9-30-1982 “Security by Secrecy” will weaken U.S. technological capabilities. There is no practical way to restrict international scientific communication without also disrupting domestic scientific communication. Build “high walls around narrow areas” in pursuit of “security by accomplishment”. Identify and devise controls only for “Gray Areas”.
19	18 Months After Corson Report, May 1984 After four attempts to formulate a new policy, “hope has faded”. M. Wallerstein, Science, May 4, 1984 Interagency review (National Security Decision Directive 14-82, NSDD 1-830), remained incomplete and the process itself classified; DOD internal reviews continued; Incidents of forced withdrawal of papers continued.
20	DOD Forum Working Group • From 1982 to 1984 the Working Group tried to define and then implement a category “unclassified but sensitive”; i.e.., Corson Panel gray areas. April 17, 1984: effort abandoned in favor of only two categories “classified” and “unclassified”. May 24, 1984: DOD announced a draft national policy agreed to by DOD and OSTP. Dialogue produced changes agreed to on 9-14-84. October 1, 1984: DeLauer memorandum to the Services and DARPA - the basis for NSDD 189. Forum hoped for a “new era of closer cooperation”.
21	“Scientific Communications and National Security” R. DeLauer Must distinguish science from technology; technology from know-how. Nature yields her secrets to anyone. Ideas cannot be stopped at national borders. Benefits of open publication far outweigh the risks. “Ultimately the relationships among academia, government and industry will depend on the trust and understanding among the people who work together and depend on one another.” Science, 10-5-84
22	Tested Throughout: The Principles of Universities “When the rubber hits the road”, some will take the money with new restrictions attached. AAUP: “has thought it inappropriate to condemn faculties and universities for making such arrangements per se, but it has regularly expressed concern that inconsistency with respect to academic freedom is a genuine danger that all academic institutions should weigh carefully in the research and the restrictions they accept.” Report October 1982; Science, 1-21-1983
23	Groucho Expressed The Possibilities His Way “These are my principles. If you don’t like them, I have others!” ********** “Once you give up your integrity, everything else is a piece of cake.”
24	NSDD 189: September 21, 1985 “It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted. …that where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally-funded fundamental research in science, technology, and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification.
25	NSDD 189, con’t Each federal government agency is responsible for: a)determining whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if so, controlling the research results through standard classification procedures; b) periodically reviewing all research grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements for potential classification.
26	NSDD 189 con’t No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. Statutes.” Ronald Reagan, September 21, 1985
27	Why The Loophole? The final clause represents: political compromise necessary to obtain it; the seeds of continuing controversy.
28	Today’s Fears: The Hart-Rudman Commission, March 2001 “Second only to a weapon of mass destruction detonating in an American city, we can think of nothing more dangerous than a failure to manage properly science, technology, and education for the common good over the next quarter century.”
29	Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2, 10-29-01 “3. Abuse of International Student Status… The program shall identify sensitive courses of study, and shall include measures whereby DOS, DOJ, and U.S. academic institutions, working together, can identify problematic applicants for student visas and deny their applications…the Sec.State, AG, Sec.Ed shall consult with the academic community and other interested parties.”
30	Dr. Rice Letter to Dr. Harold Brown, CSIS, 11-1-01 • “In the context of broad-based review of our technology transfer controls that will begin this year, this Administration will review and update as appropriate the export control policies that affect basic research in the United States. In the interim, the policy on the transfer of scientific, technical and engineering information set forth in NSDD-189 shall remain in effect, and we will ensure that this policy is followed.” • Dr. John Marburger has reaffirmed this at NAS and in congressional testimony.
31	Three New Statutes • USA Patriot Act, P.L. 107-56, 10-26-01 • The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, P.L. 107-173, 5-14-02 • The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, P.L. 107-188, 6-12-2002 • Problems appear to be greater in implementation than in statute.
32	The Growing Effects of Post-911 Fears Access by foreign students and scholars to U.S. institutions, organizations and conferences denied. Last October, almost 100 scientists were prevented from attending the World Space Congress in Houston due to visa delays. Objectionable clauses are inserted into contracts. First-time security concerns in the life sciences; e.g.., select agents, inventory controls, approved persons, laboratory security. “sensitive but unclassified” again is bubbling up.
33	Effects, con’t Students and researchers denied return visas. Classes, laboratories disrupted. Enforcement mechanisms are slowly but steadily being broadened bottom up without consultation. Technology Alert List is a creeping blanket across science, engineering; e.g., civil engineering, urban planning, landscape architecture. SEVIS implementation is plagued with problems. Well-intentioned individuals in the system are making self-protective conservative decisions.
34	Context 2003 • The Nation’s security, our global leadership, the growth of our economy (50%+) and our health depend on the excellence of our S&T. Rapidly advancing research and education still depend on openness within our institutions and across borders. Science and technology are global. Looking ahead, the U.S. must remain the first destination of choice for the world’s best minds; they now have unprecedented options.
35	Recent Initiatives More meetings on this than one can possibly attend. House Committee on Science just requested a GAO study of visa backlog. CSIS-National Academies 2-year collaboration how to manage risks of malevolent use of “sensitive unclassified information”; how to address international peer-to-peer contacts and visits while ensuring a thriving and secure scientific environment; - fostering dialogue & analysis - science and security; - co-chairs: Harold Brown, David Baltimore.
36	In Conclusion, This Is Not The 1960s The Nation’s research universities: - strongly support appropriate homeland security efforts; - they are prepared to cooperate as partners with government.
37	New Policy Mechanisms Are Needed It is time for government to bring universities and industry to the policy table. New, clear government-wide policy direction is needed from the top. Informed, workable policy will require new mechanisms of consultation and deep commitments to collaborative problem solving by universities, researchers and government. On April 14, Secretary Ridge will address the AAU. A new chapter of this story may begin.
38	Thank You (in order of appearance) Paul Gray Walter Milne Richard DeLauer Donald Kennedy Robert Rosenzweig Leo Young Jeanne Carney David A. Wilson Mitchell Wallerstein John McTague Rosemary Chalk