Joint letter from AAU, APLU and COGR regarding S. 3211, the Safeguarding United States Satellite Leadership and Security Act of 2012. The letter addresses export control policies for research satellites.
AAU and COGR submitted a comment letter for FAR Case 2011-020, regarding a proposed FAR rule on information technology security requirements. The proposed rule cites the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002.
AAU and the Council on Governmental Relations submit comments to the Department of Commerce on proposed changes in export control regulations.
AAU, COGR response to NPRM issued by DOE regarding Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities.
AAU and COGR respond to the July 15, 2011 Federal Register Notice on Proposed Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML).
AAU, COGR Joint Comment to DFARS on Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information
The federal regulation of research has become excessively burdensome, argue staff members from AAU and COGR in an article in Issues in Science and Technology. Increasing regulatory and reporting requirements should be replaced by new and more timely and flexible mechanisms for universities and associations to work with federal officials.
Council on Governmental Relations (COGR) and the Association of American Universities (AAU) respond to the April 13, 2011, Federal Register notice requesting comments on proposed policy changes to the definition of “defense services.”
We are encouraged that President Obama has asked the federal agencies to conduct this retrospective review of existing rules to assess which should be maintained, modified, strengthened or repealed to increase efficiencies and decrease burden. Research institutions seek to find a balance between achieving regulatory compliance and conducting research. We have advocated for a fundamental examination and evaluation of the current relationship between research institutions and the federal government to strengthen and, in some cases, repair the relationship to ensure increased productivity. One of the key aspects of this assessment is regulatory reform.
AAAS, AAU, APLU, and COGR response letter to State and Commerce Departments' proposed changes to export controls lists.
AAU President Robert M. Berdahl and Stanford University President John Hennessy issued the following statements today in response to an announcement by the White House of its plans to reform the nation‟s system of export controls. President Hennessy leads AAU‟s Export Controls Task Force and served as co-chair of the National Academies‟ Committee on Science, Security and Prosperity, which issued the 2009 report, “Beyond „Fortress America‟: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World.”
The Department ofDefense (DoD) fully supports free scientific exchanges and dissemination of research results to the maximum extent possible. Critical to enabling exchanges and dissemination is an understanding on the part ofDoD acquisition personnel and the research community ofthe statutes, regulations, and policies governing restrictions that apply to the DoD on basic and applied research, recognizing the necessarily open nature of unclassified fundamental research. Understanding will help guide DoD acquisition personnel and contract and grant recipients in making plans and decisions that will affect performance of research under DoD awards and implementing measures that may be needed to comply with appropriate controls.
Dear Mr. Tarragon: We are responding on behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR) to the February 8, 2010 Federal Register notice concerning the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) proposal to add a “Deemed Export Acknowledgement” question to the Form I-129.
Dear Ms. Hitt: On behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR), please find attached our response to the July 21, 2008 Federal Register Notice soliciting comments on the interim Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) rule addressing requirements for complying with export control laws and regulations when performing Department of Defense (DOD) contracts (RIN 0750-AF13).
On behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR), we are pleased to respond to the May 19, 2008 Federal Register Notice soliciting comments on two specific recommendations made by the Deemed Export Advisory Committee (DEAC) in its report, “The Deemed Export Rule in the Era of Globalization.”
On behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR), we welcome the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Request for Information (RFI) published in the May 19 Federal Register soliciting comments on recommendations made by the Deemed Export Advisory Committee (DEAC).
Undersecretary of Defense John J. Young, Jr. has issued a memorandum to the military services and defense agencies reiterating that the Department of Defense (DOD) will not restrict disclosure of DOD-funded basic and applied research results unless the research is classified for national security reasons or otherwise restricted by statute, regulation, or executive order.
Over the past several years, U.S. universities have raised concerns that federal agencies increasingly are adding clauses to contracts and grants for basic research projects that restrict publication of research results and limit the participation by foreign nationals. These “troublesome clauses” appear to contradict the federal government’s policy under National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189—which states that fundamental research and its products should remain unrestricted and that any restrictions should be handled through the classification system—as well as the fundamental research exclusion in federal export regulations.
The Department of Defense (DoD) fully supports free scientific exchanges and dissemination of research results to the maximum extent possible. Critical to enabling exchanges and dissemination is an understanding on the part ofDoD program managers, potential grantees, and contractors of the policies governing restrictions that may be imposed by the DoD on basic and applied research. Understanding will help guide DoD program managers, and contract and grant recipients, in making plans and decisions that will affect performance of research under DoD awards and implementing measures that may be needed to comply with security controls.
Deemed Export Advisory Committee Report
Dear Mr. Mooney, On behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR), we write to provide comments in response to the systematic review of the Commerce Control List (CCL) that is being undertaken by the Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). AAU represents 60 leading U.S. public and private research universities and is devoted to maintaining a strong national system of academic research and education. COGR is an association of 175 research-intensive universities, affiliated hospitals, and research institutes that is specifically concerned with the impact of government regulations, policies, and practices on the performance of research conducted at U.S. colleges and universities.
This statement presents the joint recommendations of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR) to the U.S. Department of Commerce Deemed Export Advisory Committee (DEAC). AAU represents 60 leading U.S. public and private research universities and is devoted to maintaining a strong national system of academic research and education. COGR is an association of 175 research-intensive universities, affiliated hospitals, and research institutes that is specifically concerned with the impact of government regulations, policies, and practices on the performance of research conducted at U.S. colleges and universities.
Deemed Exports -- An Academic's View
The Association of American Universities (AAU) represents 60 leading U.S. research universities. AAU universities constitute an exceptional national resource, conducting more than half of all federally sponsored university-based research. These institutions award approximately 17 percent of all U.S. bachelors degrees, 20 percent of masters degrees and more than 50 percent of all doctoral and postdoctoral degrees, many of which are in fields of science and engineering critical to the nation’s defense.
The Commerce Department deserves much praise for bringing together this outstanding group of representatives from the business, academic, and national security and intelligence communities to serve on this newly created Deemed Export Advisory Committee.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is announcing the creation of a Federal Advisory Committee that will review and provide recommendations to the Department of Commerce on deemed export policy. The Deemed Export Advisory Committee (DEAC) will help ensure that the deemed export licensing policy most effectively protects national security while ensuring the U.S. continues to be at the leading edge of technological innovation. This notice also provides an overview of steps that BIS has taken to improve understanding of deemed export policy within academia and industry, including outreach activities conducted by 2 BIS.
John Vaughn: The nation’s research universities are encouraged by the Department of Commerce’s anticipated announcement that it will establish a Deemed Export Advisory Committee to evaluate current deemed export policies and to recommend further steps related to recommendations by its inspector general (IG) on deemed export regulations.
Dear Undersecretary McCormick: On behalf of the AAU Task Force on Export Controls, we write concerning the proposed rule that the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) plans to release shortly concerning deemed exports. While we have not had the opportunity to review the actual language of the proposed rule, a number of our members have had the opportunity to hear its contents described by BIS officials, most notably in a presentation to members of the AAU Task Force and the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Scientific Communications and National Security (CSCANS) by Assistant Secretary of Export Administration Peter Lichtenbaum on October 31, 2005.
Dear Mr. Krieg: I write on behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU), an association representing 60 leading U.S. research universities, to express concerns regarding the recently released Department of Defense Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) in order to address the disclosure of export-controlled information and technology. In particular, I write to urge you to extend the comment period for the proposed rule.
EXPORT CONTROLS BACKGROUND • The scientific and higher education communities are concerned about proposed changes to export control regulations. In spring 2004, the Inspectors General (IGs) of several federal agencies (i.e. DOC, DOD, DHS, DOE and the Dept. of State), recommended increased application of “deemed” export
Deemed export control regulations affect the security, economic and scientific leaderships of our nation. It is essential that we get the balance among them right..
I am Dan Mote, President of the University of Maryland, and I thank you for the opportunity to speak today at the Export Control Task Force Meeting. Export Control regulations affect the university research enterprise that has made our country great and the security and future economic and scientific leaderships of the nation. It is essential that we get it right. U.S. research universities are eager and willing to participate as partners in this effort.
Dear Dr. Rice, Dr. Marburger, Mr. Friedman, and Ms. Spellings: We respectfully request your counsel and assistance regarding troubling developments in national export control policy and its application to university research. In particular, we draw your attention to recent reinterpretations and proposed changes in regulations that we believe should be of great mutual concern to the federal government and the U.S. research university community.
The April 16, 2004 report of the Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State and the Central Intelligence Agency, Interagency Review of Foreign National Access to Export-Controlled Technology in the United States (D-2004-062), contains recommendations of serious concern to research universities. Particularly troublesome is the call for reexamination of several federal export license exemptions of critical importance to universities, including the fundamental research and education exemptions. The report also summarizes the recommendations for enhanced compliance with export controls in the State and Homeland Security IG reports, neither of which has been made public. Should the IG recommendations result in narrowing or eliminating the existing licensing exemptions, the effect would be to alter the culture of openness that has been a hallmark of, and critical to, the success of U.S. research universities. Contrary to their intended purpose, such changes could have a substantial negative impact on U.S. national security and economic competitiveness.
The March 25, 2004 report of the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG), Export- Controlled Technology at Contractor, University, and Federally Funded Research and Development Center Facilities (D-2004-061), contains several recommendations that, if implemented by DOD, raise serious issues for research universities. Of greatest concern is the recommendation that an export control compliance clause be incorporated into DOD contracts, without recognizing the fundamental research exclusion that protects fundamental university research from export control licensing requirements. This is likely to result in a significant increase in the number of export control clauses that appear in university contracts, especially in subcontracts coming from industry. Once inserted these clauses will be difficult, if not impossible, to renegotiate. It also will seriously weaken the partnership between defense agencies and U.S. universities.
The March 31, 2004 report of the Department of Commerce Inspector General (IG), Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the U.S. (IPE-16176), contains recommendations causing grave concern to research universities. Their emphasis on “deemed exports”(defined as the release of controlled technology or technical data that conveys information to a foreign entity or individual in the U.S.), is particularly troublesome. Key issues include the following:
Dear Drs. Hasselmo and Phillips: Thank you for your letters regarding the recently promulgated clarifications to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). As you mentioned, my office worked closely with the Departments of Defense and State, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to help resolve ITAR-related issues facing universities engaged in space-based fundamental research. I believe the interim final rule balances fundamental research and national security.
Dear Jack, We deeply appreciate your interest in the problems universities are facing with spacebased fundamental research governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). We know that your office was involved with NASA, DOD, the Department of State, and other agencies in seeking to ameliorate some of the recent problems and we appreciate your leadership, as well as the technical expertise of Vic Teplitz on your staff. We are writing today in response to your invitation for our assessment of the recently promulgated clarifications to the ITAR regulations, which were published in the Federal Register on March 29.
In the 1999 Department of Defense Authorization bill, Congress transferred responsibility for satellite technology to the State Department from the Commerce Department. Research activity that once was subject to the fundamental research exclusion under National Security Directive 189 was, for the first time, formally regulated and made subject to the State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). Adverse impacts on research at universities have been substantial, as described below.
Dear Dr. Brown: Thank you for conveying the concerns of the Council on the Future of Technology and Public Policy regarding export controls and fundamental research. On behalf of the President, I would like to respond to your comments on this matter.
Dear Dr. Epstein: We very much appreciate OSTP agreeing to examine the impact of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) on university space-related research. In a letter to Nils Hasselmo, Peter Magrath, and Milton Goldberg, OSTP Director Neal Lane requested examples of ITAR's impact on universities. We hope the following will be helpful.
Dear Neal, We are asking your help in resolving a problem that universities involved in space research are having with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Several agencies, including NASA, the State Department, the Commerce Department, and the Energy Department, are already involved, but the result seems to be more confusion, not clarification. We note that a similar situation arose in 1981, prompting several university presidents to write then-Secretaries Baldrige, Haig, and Weinberger for assistance. That letter is attached.
This directive establishes national policy for controlling the flow of science, technology and engineering information produced in federally funded fundamental research at colleges, universities, and laboratories. Fundamental research is defined as follows: "'Fundamental research' means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons."
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